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the criterion of a good form of government(chap.2) - john stuart mill lyrics

the criterion of a good
form of government

the form of government for any given country being (within
certain definite conditions) amenable to choice, it is now to
be considered by what test the choice should be directed; what
are the distinctive characteristics of the form of government
best fitted to promote the interests of any given society
before entering into this inquiry, it may seem necessary to
decide what are the proper functions of government; for
government altogether being only a means, the eligibility of
the means must depend on their adaptation to the end. but
this mode of stating the problem gives less aid to its investigation than might be supposed, and does not even bring the
whole of the question into view. for, in the first place, the
proper functions of a government are not a fixed thing, but
different in different states of society; much more extensive
in a backward than in an advanced state. and, secondly, the
character of a government or set of political inst-tutions can not be sufficiently estimated while we confine our attention
to the legitimate sphere of governmental functions; for
though the goodness of a government is necessarily circ-mscribed within that sphere, its badness unhappily is not.every kind and degree of evil of which mankind are susceptible
may be inflicted on them by their government, and none of
the good which social existence is capable of can be any further ther realized than as the const-tution of the government is
compatible with, and allows scope for, its attainment. not
to speak of indirect effects, the direct meddling of the public
authorities has no necessary limits but those of human life
and the influence of government on the well-being of society can be considered or estimated in reference to nothing
less than the whole of the interests of humanity
being thus obliged to place before ourselves, as the test of
good and bad government, so complex an object as the aggregate interests of society, we would willingly attempt some
kind of cl-ssification of those interests, which, bringing them
before the mind in definite groups, might give indication of
the qualities by which a form of government is fitted to promote those various interests respectively. it would be a great facility if we could say the good of society consists of such
and such elements; one of these elements requires such conditions another such others; the government, then, which
unites in the greatest degree all these conditions, must be the
best. the theory of government would thus be built up from
the separate theorems of the elements which compose a good
state of society
unfortunately, to enumerate and cl-ssify the const-tuents
of social well-being, so as to admit of the formation of such
theorems is no easy task. most of those who, in the last or
present generation, have applied themselves to the philosophy of politics in any comprehensive spirit, have felt the
importance of such a cl-ssification, but the attempts which
have been made toward it are as yet limited, so far as i am
aware, to a single step. the cl-ssification begins and ends
with a part-tion of the exigencies of society between the two
heads of order and progress (in the phraseology of french
thinkers); permanence and progression, in the words of
coleridge. this division is plausible and seductive, from the
apparently clean-cut opposition between its two members
and the remarkable difference between the sentiments to which they appeal. but i apprehend that (however admissible for purposes of popular discourse) the distinction between n order, or permanence and progress, employed to define the qualities necessary in a government, is unscientific
and incorrect
for, first, what are order and progress? concerning progress
there is no difficulty, or none which is apparent at first sight
when progress is spoken of as one of the wants of human
society, it may be supposed to mean improvement. that is a
tolerably distinct idea. but what is order? sometimes it means
more, sometimes less, but hardly ever the whole of what
human society needs except improvement
in its narrowest acceptation, order means obedience. a
government is said to preserve order if it succeeds in getting
itself obeyed. but there are different degrees of obedience
and it is not every degree that is commendable. only an
unmitigated despotism demands that the individual citizen
shall obey unconditionally every mandate of persons in authority.we must at least limit the definition to such mandates as are general, and issued in the deliberate form of laws
order, thus understood, expresses, doubtless, an indispensable attribute of government. those who are unable to make
their ordinances obeyed, can not be said to govern. but
though a necessary condition, this is not the object of government.that it should make itself obeyed is requisite, in
order that it may accomplish some other purpose. we are
still to seek what is this other purpose, which government
ought to fulfill abstractedly from the idea of improvement
and which has to be fulfilled in every society, whether stationary or progressive.in a sense somewhat more enlarged, order means the preservation of peace by the cessation of private violence. order
is said to exist where the people of the country have, as a
general rule, ceased to prosecute their quarrels by private force
and acquired the habit of referring the decision of their disputes and the redress of their injuries to the public authorties. but in this larger use of the term, as well as in the former
narrow one, order expresses rather one of the conditions of
government, than either its purpose or the criterion of its
excellence; for the habit may be well established of submitting to the government, and referring all disputed matters to
its authority, and yet the manner in which the government deals with those disputed matters, and with the other things
about which it concerns itself, may differ by the whole interval which divides the best from the worst possible
if we intend to comprise in the idea of order all that society requires from its government which is not included in
the idea of progress, we must define order as the preservation of all kinds and amounts of good which already exist
and progress as consisting in the increase of them. this distinction does comprehend in one or the other section every
thing which a government can be required to promote. but
thus understood, it affords no basis for a philosophy of government we can not say that, in const-tuting a polity, certain provisions ought to be made for order and certain othes for progress, since the conditions of order, in the sense
now indicated, and those of progress, are not opposite, but
the same. the agencies which tend to preserve the social good
which already exists are the very same which promote the
increase of it, and vice versâ, the sole difference being, that a
greater degree of those agencies is required for the latter purpose than for the former
what, for example, are the qualities in the citizens indvidually which conduce most to keep up the amount of good
conduct, of good management, of success and prosperity
which already exist in society? every body will agree that
those qualities are industry, integrity, justice, and prudence
but are not these, of all qualities, the most conducive to improvement? and is not any growth of these virtues in the
community in itself the greatest of improvements? if so
whatever qualities in the government are promotive of industry, integrity, justice, and prudence, conduce alike to permanence and to progression, only there is needed more of
those qualities to make the society decidedly progressive than
merely to keep it permanent
what, again, are the particular attributes in human beings
which seem to have a more especial reference to progress
and do not so directly suggest the ideas of order and presevation? they are chiefly the qualities of mental activity, enterprise, and courage. but are not all these qualities fully as
much required for preserving the good we have as for adding
to it? if there is any thing certain in human affairs, it is that
valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by the continuation of the same energies which gained them. things left to take care of themselves inevitably decay. those whom success cess induces to relax their habits of care and thoughtfulness
and their willingness to encounter disagreeables, seldom long
retain their good fortune at its height. the mental attribute
which seems exclusively dedicated to progress, and is the
culmination of the tendencies to it, is originality, or invention. yet this is no less necessary for permanence, since, in
the inevitable changes of human affairs, new inconveniences
and dangers continually grow up, which must be encountered by new resources and contrivances, in order to keep
things going on even only as well as they did before. what ever qualities, therefore, in a government, tend to encourage
activity, energy, courage, originality, are requisites of permanence as well as of progress, only a somewhat less degree of
them will, on the average, suffice for the former purpose
than for the latter
to p-ss now from the mental to the outward and objective
requisites of society: it is impossible to point out any contrivance in politics, or arrangement of social affairs, which
conduces to order only, or to progress only; whatever tends
to either promotes both. take, for instance, the common inst-tution of a police. order is the object which seems most
immediately interested in the efficiency of this part of the
social organization. yet, if it is effectual to promote order
that is, if it represses crime, and enables every one to feel his
person and property secure, can any state of things be more
conducive to progress? the greater security of property is
one of the main conditions and causes of greater prodution, which is progress in its most familiar and vulgarest aspect the better repression of crime represses the dispositions which tend to crime, and this is progress in a some what higher sense. the release of the individual from the
cares and anxieties of a state of imperfect protection sets his
faculties free to be employed in any new effort for improving his own state and that of others, while the same cause, by
attaching him to social existence, and making him no longer
see present or prospective enemies in his fellow creatures
fosters all those feelings of kindness and fellowship towards
others, and interest in the general well-being of the community, which are such important parts of social improvement
take, again, such a familiar case as that of a good system of
taxation and finance. this would generally be cl-ssed as belonging to the province of order. yet what can be more conducive to progress? a financial system which promotes the
one, conduces, by the very same excellences, to the other
economy, for example, equally preserves the existing stock
of national wealth, and favors the creation of more. a just
distribution of burdens, by holding up to every citizen an
example of morality and good conscience applied to diffcult adjustments, and an evidence of the value which the
highest authorities attach to them, tends in an eminent dgree to educate the moral sentiments of the community, both
in respect of strength and of discrimination. such a mode of
levying the taxes as does not impede the industry, or unnecessarily interfere with the liberty of the citizen, promotes
not the preservation only, but the increase of the national
wealth, and encourages a more active use of the individual
faculties. and vice versâ, all errors in finance and taxation
which obstruct the improvement of the people in wealth and
morals, tend also, if of sufficiently serious amount, positively
to impoverish and demoralize them. it holds, in short, unversally, that when order and permanence are taken in their
widest sense for the stability of existing advantages, the requisites of progress are but the requisites of order in a greater
degree; those of permanence merely those of progress in a
somewhat smaller measure
in support of the position that order is intrinsically different from progress, and that preservation of existing and aquisition of additional good are sufficiently distinct to aford the basis of a fundamental cl-ssification, we shall perhaps be reminded that progress may be at the expense of
order; that while we are acquiring, or striving to acquire
good of one kind, we may be losing ground in respect to
others; thus there may be progress in wealth, while there is
deterioration in virtue. granting this, what it proves is, not
that progress is generically a different thing from permanence
but that wealth is a different thing from virtue. progress is
permanence and something more; and it is no answer to this
to say that progress in one thing does not imply permanence
in every thing. no more does progress in one thing imply
progress in every thing. progress of any kind includes permanence in that same kind: whenever permanence is sacrificed to some particular kind of progress, other progress is
still more sacrificed to it; and if it be not worth the sacrifice,not the interest of permanence alone has been disregarded
but the general interest of progress has been mistaken
if these improperly contrasted ideas are to be used at all in
the attempt to give a first commencement of scientific precision to the notion of good government, it would be more
philosophically correct to leave out of the definition the word
order, and to say that the best government is that which is
most conducive to progress. for progress includes order
but order does not include progress. progress is a greater
degree of that of which order is a less. order, in any other
sense, stands only for a part of the prerequisites of good government, not for its idea and essence. order would find a
more suitable place among the conditions of progress, since
if we would increase our sum of good, nothing is more indispensable than to take due care of what we already have. if
we are endeavouring after more riches, our very first rule
should be, not to squander uselessly our existing means
order, thus considered, is not an additional end to be reconciled with progress, but a part and means of progress itself. if
a gain in one respect is purchased by a more than equivalent
loss in the same or in any other, there is not progress. conduciveness to progress, thus understood, includes the whole
excellence of a government
but, though metaphysically defensible, this definition of
the criterion of good government is not appropriate, because
though it contains the whole of the truth, it recalls only a
part. what is suggested by the term progress is the idea of
moving onward, whereas the meaning of it here is quite as
much the prevention of falling back. the very same social
causes—the same beliefs, feelings, inst-tutions, and practices—are as much required to prevent society from retrograding as to produce a further advance. were there no improvement to be hoped for, life would not be the less an
unceasing struggle against causes of deterioration, as it even
now is. politics, as conceived by the ancients, consisted wholly
in this. the natural tendency of men and their works was to
degenerate, which tendency, however, by good inst-tutions
virtuously administered, it might be possible for an indefnite length of time to counteract. though we no longer hold
this opinion; though most men in the present age profess
the contrary creed, believing that the tendency of things, on
the whole, is toward improvement, we ought not to forgetthat there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human
affairs toward the worse, consisting of all the follies, all the
vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of
mankind, which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping
all before it, by the exertions which some persons constantly
and others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and
worthy objects. it gives a very insufficient idea of the impotance of the strivings which take place to improve and eevate human nature and life to suppose that their chief value
consists in the amount of actual improvement realized by
their means, and that the consequence of their cessation
would merely be that we should remain as we are. a very
small diminution of those exertions would not only put a
stop to improvement, but would turn the general tendency
of things toward deterioration, which, once begun, would
proceed with increasingly rapidity, and become more and
more difficult to check, until it reached a state often seen in
history, and in which many large portions of mankind even
now grovel; when hardly any thing short of superhuman
power seems sufficient to turn the tide, and give a fresh commencement to the upward movement.these reasons make the word progress as unapt as the terms
order and permanence to become the basis for a cl-ssification
of the requisites of a form of government. the fundamental
ant-thesis which these words express does not lie in the things
themselves, so much as in the types of human character which
answer to them. there are, we know, some minds in which
caution, and others in which boldness, predominates; in some
the desire to avoid imperilling what is already possessed is a
stronger sentiment than that which prompts to improve the
old and acquire new advantages; while there are others who
lean the contrary way, and are more eager for future than careful of present good. the road to the ends of both is the same;
but they are liable to wander from it in opposite directions
this consideration is of importance in composing the personnel of any political body: persons of both types ought to be
included in it, that the tendencies of each may be tempered
in so far as they are excessive, by a due proportion of the other
there needs no express provision to insure this object, provided care is taken to admit nothing inconsistent with it. the
natural and spontaneous admixture of the old and the young
of those whose position and reputation are made and those who have them still to make, will in general sufficiently answer the purpose, if only this natural balance is not disturbed
by artificial regulation
since the distinction most commonly adopted for the clasification of social exigencies does not possess the properties
needful for that use, we have to seek for some other leading
distinction better adapted to the purpose. such a distinction
would seem to be indicated by the considerations to which i
now proceed
if we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good
government in all its senses, from the humblest to the most
exalted, depends, we find that the princ-p-l of them, the
one which transcends all others, is the qualities of the human beings composing the society over which the government is exercised
we may take, as a first instance, the administration of justice; with the more propriety, since there is no part of public
business in which the mere machinery, the rules and contrivances for conducting the details of the operation, are of
such vital consequence. yet even these yield in importance
to the qualities of the human agents employed. of what eficacy are rules of procedure in securing the ends of justice if
the moral condition of the people is such that the witnesses
generally lie, and the judges and their subordinates take bribes? again, how can inst-tutions provide a good municpal administration if there exists such indifference to the subject that those who would administer honestly and capably
can not be induced to serve, and the duties are left to those
who undertake them because they have some private interest to be promoted? of what avail is the most broadly popular representative system if the electors do not care to choose
the best member of parliament, but choose him who will
spend most money to be elected? how can a representative
-ssembly work for good if its members can be bought, or if
their excitability of temperament, uncorrected by public discipline or private self-control, makes them incapable of calm
deliberation, and they resort to manual violence on the floor
of the house, or shoot at one another with rifles? how, again
can government, or any joint concern, be carried on in a
tolerable manner by people so envious that, if one among
them seems likely to succeed in any thing, those who ought
to cooperate with him form a tacit combination to make
him fail? whenever the general disposition of the people is
such that each individual regards those only of his interests
which are selfish, and does not dwell on, or concern himself
for, his share of the general interest, in such a state of things
good government is impossible. the influence of defects of
intelligence in obstructing all the elements of good government requires no ill-stration. government consists of acts
done by human beings; and if the agents, or those who choose
the agents, or those to whom the agents are responsible, or
the lookers-on whose opinion ought to influence and check
all these, are mere m-sses of ignorance, stupidity, and baleful
prejudice, every operation of government will go wrong;
while, in proportion as the men rise above this standard, so
will the government improve in quality up to the point of
excellence, attainable but nowhere attained, where the officers of government, themselves persons of superior virtue and
intellect, are surrounded by the atmosphere of a virtuous
and enlightened public opinion
the first element of good government, therefore, being
the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing
the community, the most important point of excellence whichany form of government can possess is to promote the virtue
and intelligence of the people themselves. the first question
in respect to any political inst-tutions is how far they tend to
foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual, or rather (following
bentham’s more complete cl-ssification) moral, intellectual
and active. the government which does this the best has
every likelihood of being the best in all other respects, since
it is on these qualities, so far as they exist in the people, that
all possibility of goodness in the practical operations of the
government depends
we may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of
a government, the degree in which it tends to increase the
sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and indvidually, since, besides that their well-being is the sole object
of government, their good qualities supply the moving force
which works the machinery. this leaves, as the other const-tuent element of the merit of a government, the quality of
the machinery itself; that is, the degree in which it is adapted
to take advantage of the amount of good qualities which
may at any time exist, and make them instrumental to the right purposes. let us again take the subject of judicature as
an example and ill-stration. the judicial system being given
the goodness of the administration of justice is in the compound ratio of the worth of the men composing the tribunals, and the worth of the public opinion which influences
or controls them. but all the difference between a good and
a bad system of judicature lies in the contrivances adopted
for bringing whatever moral and intellectual worth exists in
the community to bear upon the administration of justice
and making it duly operative on the result. the arrangements
for rendering the choice of the judges such as to obtain the
highest average of virtue and intelligence; the salutary forms
of procedure; the publicity which allows observation and
criticism of whatever is amiss; the liberty of discussion and
cinsure through the press; the mode of taking evidence, acording as it is well or ill adapted to elicit truth; the facilities
whatever be their amount, for obtaining access to the tribunals; the arrangements for detecting crimes and apprehending offenders-all these things are not the power, but the machinery for bringing the power into contact with the obstacle; and the machinery has no action of itself, but without-t the power, let it be ever so ample, would be wasted and of
no effect. a similar distinction exists in regard to the consttution of the executive departments of administration. their
machinery is good, when the proper tests are prescribed for
the qualifications of officers, the proper rules for their promotion; when the business is conveniently distributed among
those who are to transact it, a convenient and methodical
order established for its transaction, a correct and intelligible
record kept of it after being transacted; when each individual
knows for what he is responsible, and is known to others as
responsible for it; when the best-contrived checks are provided against negligence, favoritism, or jobbery in any of the
acts of the department. but political checks will no more act
of themselves than a bridle will direct a horse without a rider
if the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as negligent as
those whom they ought to check, and if the public, the mainspring of the whole checking machinery, are too ignorant
too p-ssive, or too careless and inattentive to do their part
little benefit will be derived from the best administrative
apparatus. yet a good apparatus is always preferable to a bad
it enables such insufficient moving or checking power as existsto act at the greatest advantage; and without it, no amount
of moving or checking power would be sufficient. publicity
for instance, is no impediment to evil, nor stimulus to good
if the public will not look at what is done; but without publicity, how could they either check or encourage what they
were not permitted to see? the ideally perfect const-tution
of a public office is that in which the interest of the funcary is entirely coincident with his duty. no mere system
will make it so, but still less can it be made so without a
system, aptly devised for the purpose
what we have said of the arrangements for the detailed administration of the government is still more evidently true of
its general const-tution. all government which aims at being
good is an organization of some part of the good qualities
existing in the individual members of the community for the
conduct of its collective affairs. a representative const-tution
is a means of bringing the general standard of intelligence and
honesty existing in the community, and the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest members, more directly to bear
upon the government, and investing them with greater influence in it than they would have under any other mode of

- john stuart mill lyrics

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